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Abstract
The U.S. labor market has been experiencing unprecedented high av-
erage unemployment duration. The shift in the unemployment duration
distribution can be traced back to the early nineties. In this study, cen-
sored quantile regression methods are employed to analyze the changes in
the US unemployment duration distribution. We explore the decomposi-
tion method proposed by Machado and Mata (2005) to disentangle the
contribution of the changes generated by the covariate distribution and
by the conditional distribution. The data used in this inquiry are taken
from the nationally representative Displaced Worker Surveys of 1988 and
1998. We provide evidence that the change in the unemployment dura-
tion distribution is mainly produced by the opposing eﬀects of a sharp
rise in job-to-job transition rates and an increased sensitivity of unem-
ployment duration to unemployment rates. Compositional changes in the
labor force played a limited role. We rationalize our ﬁndings by arguing
that improved screening technology is likely to be the relevant underlying
mechanism at work.
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11 Introduction
The U.S. labor market has changed signiﬁcantly over the last two decades. Un-
employment rates fell below 4 percent and it has been argued that the ”natural
rate of unemployment” shifted downward to 5 percent or below. This sustained
trend toward lower unemployment rates was largely driven by lower unemploy-
ment inﬂows. Concurrently, however, mean elapsed unemployment duration
surprisingly trended up. Indeed, average unemployment duration reached an
historical record high of 18 weeks in 2004. Figure 1 shows that the Current
Population Survey (CPS) series of unemployment rates and median elapsed
weeks of unemployment used to be very well-aligned until the end of the eight-
ies. The two series began diverging signiﬁcantly in the early nineties and the
gap has widened ever since (see Figure 1).
The striking evolution of unemployment in the United States has not gone
un-noticed. A number of studies have examined the question of why the un-
employment duration became so much longer (Baumol and Wolf,1998; Valleta
(1998); Abraham and Shimer, 2001; Juhn, Murphy, and Topel, 2002; and,
Mukoyama and Sahin, 2004 ). Less explored has been the surprising fact that
the rate of job changing without any intervening spell of unemployment also in-
creased signiﬁcantly during the nineties. Using data from the Displaced Worker
Survey (DWS), Farber (2003) shows that the transition rates from joblessness
into employment increased among displaced workers, most notably because the
share of direct job-to-job transitions increased.
Figure 1: Unemployment rate and Unemployment Duration
2Explanations for the recent rising trend of average unemployment duration
rely either on the compositional changes of the labor force or, more funda-
mentally, on the emergence of some economic mechanisms.1 Examples of the
former explanation include Abraham and Shimer (2001), who argue that the
ageing of the baby-boom generation and the increased labor force attachment
of women contributed to the observed enlarged share of long-term unemployed;
Juhn, Murphy, and Topel (2002) who claim that joblessness among less-skilled
men has taken the form of time spent out of the labor force rather than unem-
ployment per se;2 and Valleta (2001), who reports that the increase in average
unemployment duration was produced by the joblessness experience of displaced
workers.
T h r e em a i ne c o n o m i ce x p l a n a t i o n sh a v e been oﬀered for the observed length-
ening of the average duration of unemployment. In the ﬁrst uptake, Baumol
and Wolf (1998) link average duration of unemployment to technical change, ar-
guing that the acceleration of technical change has raised the share of the labor
force that is unemployed in any period because plants close more often. Second,
Mukoyama and Sahin (2004) note that increased within-group wage inequality,
which translates into higher uncertainty about wage oﬀer distribution, is likely
to lead to longer periods of job search. Finally, Juhn, Murphy, and on Topel
(2002) maintain that long-term changes in joblessness have been produced by
adverse shifts in labor demand.
Improved search technology associated with, say, temporary-help agencies
(Autor, 2001) or use of the Internet (Kuhn and Skuterud, 2004) do not appear,
at ﬁrst sight, to help explain longer spells of joblessness. However, we shall
argue that more eﬃcient search, coupled with improved sorting mechanisms
(e.g., job screening), may indeed generate both longer average joblessness and
higher job-to-job transition rates.
In this study, we rely on censored quantile regression methods to analyze
the changes in the U.S. unemployment duration distribution. Quantiles seem
appropriate to analyze unemployment duration for two main reasons. First, the
methodology estimates the whole quantile process of duration time conditional
on the attributes of interest, which constitutes a complete characterization of the
distribution of duration time. Quantiles provide a natural way of characterizing
1The inﬂuence of methodological changes in the CPS surveys has also been studied (see,
e.g., Abraham and Shimer (2001) ).
2The relaxation of the Social Security Disability Insurance and Supplemental Security
Income eligibility rules may also help to explain the increase in non-participation rates.
3important concepts such as short- or long-term unemployment, by focusing on
the relevant tails of the duration distribution. Second, from a methodological
standpoint, it is worth observing that quantile regression provides a uniﬁed and
ﬂexible framework for such an analysis.
Changes over time in the distribution of unemployment duration may be
framed as resulting from changes in the distribution of the conditioning variables
such as the age distribution or from changes in the conditional distribution
of duration itself. We use Machado and Mata (2005) method to disentangle
those eﬀects. The basic building block is the estimation of the conditional
distribution by quantile regressions; then, by resorting to resampling procedures,
one estimates marginal distributions consistent with the estimated conditional
model as well as with hypothesized distributions for the covariates. Comparing
the marginal distributions implied by alternative distributions for the covariates
one is then able to perform counterfactual exercises that isolate the diﬀerent
eﬀects contributing to the overall change.
The data used in this inquiry are taken from the nationally representative
Displaced Worker Surveys of 1988 and 1998. The DWS is a retrospective sur-
vey that has been conducted biennially since 1984. In contains information on
the nature of the job lost and the subsequent joblessness duration of workers
displaced by reason of plant closure, slack work, or abolition of shift or posi-
tion. The DWS is particularly well suited to study the distributional shape of
unemployment duration because, unlike the CPS, it is a reprentative sample of
the ﬂow of displaced workers and because it provides information on completed
spells of unemployment.3
The Machado and Mata decomposition reveals that the main force shaping
the shift in the distribution of unemployment duration is the change in the re-
gression coeﬃcients. Here, two forces are at work. On the one hand, a higher
incidence of job-to-job transitions in the nineties lead to a thicker left tail of
the unemployment distribution, while on the other, longer durations for a given
unemployment rate yielded a displacement of the unemployment distribution
to the right. Short becomes shorter and long becomes longer. We subsequently
oﬀer a very simple model of a binomial mixture of duration distributions that
is able to reproduce this outcome through the process of sorting generated by
a more eﬃcient screening technology. It is argued that whereas more-able in-
dividuals will face higher probabilities of being hired (and also of experiencing
3Is is demonstrably harder to characterize the distribution of an unemployed population
based on the stock rather than the ﬂow of the unemployed persons (Lancaster, 1990).
4direct job-to-job transitions), their less-able counterparts will confront a lower
arrival rate of job oﬀers, thereby lengthening their joblessness experience.
Under normal conditions, for the same unemployment rate, economists would
trade higher inﬂows into unemployment for shorter mean unemployment dura-
tions. Risk aversion, distributional considerations, and the possibility of unem-
ployment hysteresis (arriving from, say, human capital depreciation, stigmatiza-
tion by employers, or loss of social networks) would justify that predisposition.
We will argue, nevertheless, that longer (measured, i.e., excluding direct transi-
tions) unemployment duration may simply be an inevitable outcome of a more
eﬃcient job screening process.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data set, providing
a careful comparison of the two Displaced Worker Surveys used. Section 3 out-
lines the econometric methodology. The basic regression results are presented in
Section 4. Section 5 deploys the Machado and Mata decomposition to sort out
the forces behind the changes in unemployment duration. Section 6 concludes.4
2D a t a
2.1 General Description
The data used in this inquiry are taken from the nationally representative, Dis-
placed Worker Supplement to the February 1988 and 1998 Current Population
Survey. The dataset - and changes in the survey, including the wording of the
core displacement question and the recall period over which information on job
loss is recorded - are well described elsewhere (see, for example, Kletzer, 1998;
Farber, 2003), so that only brief introductory remarks are required here. The
DWS has been conducted biennially since 1984. It contains information on the
nature of the lost job and subsequent joblessness for workers displaced by reason
of plant closure, slack work, or abolition of shift or position. Such data can be
supplemented by extensive information on the personal characteristics of the
worker contained in the parent CPS. The choice of the 1988 and 1998 surveys
was guided by the need to use a comparable framework to the greatest extent.
The 1988 DWS survey was the ﬁrst to provide information for a single spell of
joblessness (until 1986 the recorded jobless duration included multiple spells of
joblessness). The 1998 survey is the most recent available survey with adequate
data on joblessness duration. Still, there remain some issues of comparability
4The econometric details are presented in the Appendix.
5that will be discussed below.
The DWS has a number of advantages over administrative data. First, un-
like the unemployment registry, the DWS survey covers both recipients and
non-recipients of unemployment beneﬁts. Second, because it is retrospective,
the information on unemployment duration is not censored at the time of the
exhaustion of beneﬁts. And, third, the DWS allows the identiﬁcation of tran-
sitions of displaced workers to another job without any intervening spell of
unemployment.
It is important to collect information on job-to-job transitions because a
non-negligible portion of the displaced worker does not observe a joblessness
experience. More importantly, the incidence of this type of employment adjust-
ment increased visibly from the 1988 survey to the 1998 survey.5
There are inevitably some shortcomings of the DWS data. Retrospective
data are subject to recall bias - individuals experiencing displacement in past
years may be more likely to understate their jobless duration than are more
recent job losers - and respondents are prone to round (to months and quarters)
their reported spells of unemployment. Beginning with the 1994 survey, how-
ever, the period over which job loss is measured has been reduced from ﬁve to
three years, which should reduce the recall bias problem.
As mentioned above, since the 1988 survey the measure of unemployment
has refered to the length of the single spell of joblessness that followed the
displacement event and resulted in reemployment. To be sure, the deﬁnition still
does not require the unemployed individual to be engaged in active search, so
that this single spell may include intervals of suspended job search/withdrawal,
but it no longer includes multiple spells of joblessness. A more recent innovation
which aﬀects the 1998 survey is that the DWS unemployment data are no longer
top coded (at 99 weeks of joblessness). An additional source of right censoring
in the data stems from our inclusion (via the CPS) of those individuals who
failed to ﬁnd work after displacement but who were nevertheless economically
active as of the survey date.
Although we included those who wanted but never found employment after
losing their jobs - as well as those individuals who transitioned directly into
reemployment without any intervening spell of joblessness - we excluded indi-
5From an analytical point of view, one is interested, of course, in all the routes taken by
the workers following the occurrence of a displacement event. The consideration of direct
job-to-job transitions creates, however, some ambiguity in the measurement of unemploy-
ment duration. We shall discuss below the practical consequences of using diﬀerent measures
(including or excluding job-to-job transitions) of unemployment duration.
6viduals who were not economically active at the time of the survey. Further,
because the nature of displacement is not well deﬁned for certain individuals
and sectors, those employed part time and in agriculture at the point of dis-
placement were also excluded, as were those aged less than 20 years and above
61 years. These restrictions yielded a sample of 2,837 individuals for 1988 and
2,762 for 1998.
2.2 Comparability of the DWS Surveys
There are a number of comparability issues that need to tackled. First, and
most importantly, whereas the 1988 survey is a ﬁve-year retrospective data
set of displaced workers based on the question ”In the past ﬁve years, that
is since January 1983, has ...lost or left a job because of a plant closing, an
employer going out of business, a layoﬀ from which...was not recalled, or other
similar reason?”, the 1998 survey is a three-year retrospective data set based
on the question ”During the last three calendar years, that is, from January
of 1995 through December of 1997, did (name/you) lose a job, or leave one
because a plant or company closed or moved, (your/his/her) position or shift
was abolished, insuﬃcient work, or another similar reason?”. If the response to
the job loss core question was positive, the respondent was asked whether the
reason for displacement was 1) plant closing, 2) slack work, 3) position shifted
or abolished, 4) seasonal job ended, 5) self-employment failed, and 6) other
reasons. In line with the CPS deﬁnition of job displacement, only the ﬁrst three
situations will be considered in this study
Even though the slight change of wording is unlikely to raise any major com-
parison problems, the reduction of the retrospective period is potentially more
serious. Since there is information on the year of displacement of the worker,
one can minimize this problem excising from the 1988 sample the individuals
displaced in 1983 and 1984.6 But this procedure does not completely solve the
issue. If an individual experienced multiple spells of joblessness (which aﬀects
a fraction of displaced workers) the interviewer has instructions to record the
episode where the worker lost the job with the longest duration. It may well
occur that after loosing a long-tenure job during 1983 or 1984 an individual was
displaced again during the 1985-1987 period. In this case, this displacement
from a short-duration job is not registered. There is a clear implication for dis-
tortion of the distribution of job duration, with short job durations being likely
6Displacements that occurred during January of 1988 were also excluded. The 1998 survey
does not include, by construction, workers displaced in 1998.
7to be under represented in the 1988 survey in comparison with the 1988 survey.
But there is no unambiguous implication for the distribution of unemployment
duration.7
Second, even though unemployment rates were falling and labor market
conditions were improving over the survey periods, the cyclical conditions were
not identical. In fact, the average state unemployment rate at the time of
displacement is 1.7 percentage points lower in the 1998 survey than the 1988
survey. We expect that by conditioning the unemployment duration distribution
on labor market tightness, we will be able to isolate the impact of the business
cycle.
Third, in both surveys the displaced workers are asked whether they received
advance notice of impending their lay-oﬀ, but in the 1998 survey this question is
restricted to written notice, where in the 1988 survey the individuals distinguish
between informal and written notice. In order to make this variable as com-
parable as possible we will consider a notiﬁed only those workers who received
written notice at least two months before the date of displacement.
Apart from these three comparability issues, which can be partially over-
come, we are convinced that the two DWS surveys provide an adequate frame-
work for characterizing the the evolution of the unemployment experience of
displaced workers throughout the nineties.
3 Composition and Structure
The basic pieces of information to our counterfactual analysis are the changes
in the attributes (covariates) of the jobless population and the changes in the
distribution of duration for any given level of those attributes (”structure” or
coeﬃcient changes). The latter are estimated by censored quantile log-linear
regressions (Koenker and Bassett, 1978 and Powell, 1984, 1986).
3.1 Covariates
Descriptive information on the two samples is provided in Table 2 and Figure 3.
The composition of the 1998 sample diﬀers from that of 1988 in some important
7Some checks can, however, be implemented. First, one can compare the job duration
distribution for the 1983-1984 period with the 1985-1987 period. Second, one can exclude
from both samples workers with fewer than two years of tenure in the pre-displacement job.
And third, one can use our decomposition methodology to simulate the 1998 unemployment
distribution with the 1998 job duration distribution. In all cases we arrive to the conclusion






Gender (Male=1) 0.650 0.562
Race (White=1) 0.869 0.863




Plant Closing 0.480 0.395
Written Notice 0.054 0.131
Unemp. Rate 7.0 5.3
Unemp. Duration (completed) 12.7 11.2
Job-to-job transitions 0.120 0.189
Proportion censored 0.149 0.092
Number of observations 2837 2762
Table 1: Sample Descriptive Statistics.
• The unemployment duration is visibly shorter in the 1995-97 period than
during the 1985-87 period. This indication is best understood in the em-
pirical survival functions (Kaplan-Meier estimates) exhibited in Figure 2.,
because unemployment duration is top-coded at 99 weeks for the 1985-
87 period. Although this leftward shift is noticeable at both tails of the
joblessness distribution, upper quantiles increased relative to the mean
unemployment rate, as pointed out by Abraham and Shimer (2001). This
indication is stronger if one considers the conventional measure of unem-
ployment duration, where direct transitions without an intervening unem-
ployment spell are excluded (see Table 2).
• The proportion of direct job-to-job transitions (joblessness spells with du-
ration equal to 0) increased 7 percentage points
• Displaced workers in the nineties are older and better educated than dur-
ing the eighties, reﬂecting the ageing of the baby-boom generation (see
Figure 3).
• The proportion of female workers among displaced also increased sizeably,
probably because labor market participation rates of women at risk of
being displaced also increased over the relevant period.
9Figure 2: Kaplan-Meier Survival Functions.
• The likelihood of receiving formal notice of job lay-oﬀ more than doubled
in the nineties, probably due to the introduction of the Worker Adjustment
and Retraining Notiﬁcation Act, which was enacted in 1988, which made
pre-notiﬁcation of displacements mandatory for mass-layoﬀsor shut-downs
generated by large ﬁrms (Addison and Blackburn, 1994).
• Interestingly, despite the change in the reference period of job displace-
ments (from ﬁve to three years), there are no signiﬁcant changes in the
distribution of job duration in the pre-displacement job (see Figure 3).
It may still happen, however, that workers are now displaced with longer
tenure than before.
3.2 Coeﬃcients
We characterize the conditional distributions of jobless duration by quantile
regression (QR) models.
Empirical results for selected quantiles from ﬁtting the QR model are given
in Tables (3) and (4) for both surveys. For comparison purposes, we also pro-
10Figure 3: Kernel Densities for Age, Tenure, Schooling, and the Un-
employment rate.
11Unemployment duration quantiles
0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90
1985-1987
Including job-to-job transitions 0.00 0.28 1.14 3.70 7.40
Excluding job-to-job transitions 0.28 0.57 1.56 3.70 7.40
1995-1997
Including job-to-job transitions 0.00 0.19 0.95 3.42 7.59
Excluding job-to-job transitions 0.19 0.57 1.52 4.55 9.87
Table 2: Normalized Sample Quantiles of the Unemployment Du-
ration Distribution. Quantiles are obtained from the Kaplan-Meier
estimator. Values are normalized by average unemployment rates.
vide the estimates obtained from a Cox proportional hazard model and from
an accelerated failure time (AFT) model that employs an extended generalized
gamma distribution.8 Focusing on the 1985-1987 survey, the regression coeﬃ-
cient estimates are fairly conventional:9
• Age reduces escape rates proxying the reduced arrival rate of job oﬀers
with age.
• The impact of Tenure is statistically signiﬁcant only at high quantiles. Its
eﬀect may capture the elevated reservation wages of long-serving workers.
• The result for race is familiar and captures the poorer opportunities facing
non-whites as a result of both objective and discriminatory factors.
• The familiar (opposing) eﬀects of marital status on reemployment prob-
abilities - positive for males and negative for females - are also obtained.
The result for married males presumably picks up a household head eﬀect,
and thus likely reﬂects the higher opportunity cost of unemployment for
married males and their greater search intensity.
• Schooling enhances the chances of getting a job, but much more so for low
durations. It can be argued that larger human capital endowments are
associated with greater job opportunities and higher opportunity costs of
unemployment that necessarily erode with the progression of the unem-
ployment spell. A number of explanations can be suggested here: human
8See Addison and Portugal (1987) for an application of the extended generalized gamma
distribution to unemployment duration.
9The continuous regressors were centered at their sample means. Consequently, the in-
tercept estimates the quantile of the distribution of log duration for the “population” corre-
sponding to these mean values and to the reference values of the binary regressors.
12capital depreciation, unobserved individual heterogeneity correlated with
the measures of human capital, or employers’ stigmatization of long-term
unemployed, would lead to a fading human capital eﬀect on the transition
rate out of unemployment.
• Like schooling, written pre-notiﬁcation (deﬁned as written notice of at
least two months) and job loss by reason of plant closure have signiﬁcantly
higher eﬀects during the early phase of the unemployment spell. This
pattern reﬂects the inﬂuence of on-the-job search. Faced with the prospect
of an imminent discharge, the worker will engage in on-the-job search.
If successful, he or she will experience a short spell of unemployment
(Addison and Portugal, 1992).
• Identically, workers displaced by reason of plant closing — in comparison
with workers dismissed due to slack work or position shifted or abolished
— beneﬁt from an essentially short-term advantage conveyed by job search
assistance and early (and unmistakable) warning of displacement.
• As conventional, higher state unemployment rates are associated with
longer spells of joblessness, mirroring, at the state level, lower arrival rates
of job oﬀers.
Despite broad agreement between the regression coeﬃcient estimates from
the two surveys, there are, neverthless, some diﬀerences. For their magnitude
and potential impact on the unemployment duration distribution, two are most
striking. First, the large increase in the sensitivity of duration to the unemploy-
ment rate, meaning that any given improvement in the macroeconomic condi-
tions at the time of displacement translate into a much lower duration in 1998
than in 1988. Also the intercept dropped sharply and proportionately more so
for low durations. This reﬂects the overall shift to the left of the distribution
of duration largely generated, as we shall see, by the much higher incidence of
direct transitions.
4 Changes in the unemployment duration dis-
tribution
4.1 An overall view
The law of total probability implies that changes over time in the distribution of
unemployment duration may result from changes in the distribution of the con-
13Quantile Regression
20th 50th 80th AFT Cox
Age 0.012 0.024 0.016 0.021 -0.014
(in years) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002)
Gender -0.013 0.354 0.224 0.328 -0.224
(male=1) (0.086) (0.086) (0.101) (0.099) (0.066)
Race -0.327 -0.248 -0.379 -0.443 0.307
(white=1) (0.111) (0.111) (0.123) (0.096) (0.064)
Marital Status -0.422 -0.330 -0.210 -0.327 0.209
(married=1) (0.070) (0.076) (0.090) (0.083) (0.055)
Married*Gender 0.580 0.819 0.502 0.681 -0.429
(married female=1) (0.116) (0.119) (0.130) (0.131) (0.088)
Schooling -0.107 -0.039 -0.041 -0.065 0.040
(in years) (0.014) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.009)
Tenure -0.006 0.009 0.024 0.011 -0.008
(in years) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004)
Plant Closing -0.736 -0.417 -0.186 -0.389 0.219
(Shutdown=1) (0.062) (0.060) (0.064) (0.064) (0.041)
Written Notice -0.561 0.122 0.131 0.064 -0.065
(0.163) (0.141) (0.171) (0.140) (0.093)
Unemp.Rate 0.089 0.124 0.115 0.106 -0.071
(0.016) (0.015) (0.017) (0.016) (0.011)
Constant 1.240 2.290 3.552 2.039





Table 3: Unemployment duration regression results for 1985-1887.
14Quantile Regression
20th 50th 80th AFT Cox
Age 0.014 0.023 0.024 0.020 -0.012
(in years) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002)
Gender 0.805 0.160 0.280 0.270 -0.111
(male=1) (0.107) (0.100) (0.093) (0.104) (0.061)
Race -0.851 -0.360 -0.287 -0.435 0.225
(white=1) (0.105) ( 0.108) (0.104) (0.102) (0.061)
Marital Status -0.906 -0.391 -0.397 -0.435 0.210
(married=1) (0.110) (0.097) (0.108) (0.097) (0.057)
Married*Gender 1.225 0.496 0.535 0.532 -0.257
(married female=1) (0.144) (0.146) (0.150) (0.139) (0.082)
Schooling -0.135 -0.024 -0.035 -0.058 0.033
(in years) (0.018) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015) (0.009)
Tenure -0.024 0.022 0.030 0.016 -0.013
(in years) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.004)
Plant Closing 0.194 -0.117 -0.058 -0.063 0.041
(Shutdown=1) (0.080) (0.078) (0.079) (0.072) (0.042)
Written Notice -0.722 -0.345 -0.081 -0.244 0.050
(0.217) (0.155) (0.159) (0.106) (0.061)
Unemp.Rate 0.249 0.184 0.170 0.183 -0.107
(0.031) (0.026) (0.029) (0.029) (0.018)
Constant -0.067 2.040 3.189 1.102





Table 4: Unemployment duration regression results for 1995-97.
15ditioning variables (e.g., labor force characteristics such as the age distribution)
or from changes in the conditional distribution of duration itself (which may be
thought of as changes in the way those labor force characteristics impact dura-
tion, the “coeﬃcients”). The ﬁrst is a composition eﬀect and the second may
be thought of as a “structural eﬀect” (as in Author and Katz, 2005). Machado
and Mata (2005) proposed a method (hereafter, M&M decomposition) for dis-
entangling those eﬀects. The method is based on the estimation of marginal
distribution of the variable of interest consistent with a conditional distribution
estimated by quantile regression, as well as with any hypothesized distribution
for the covariates. Comparing the marginal distributions implied by diﬀerent
distributions for the covariates one will then able to perform counterfactual ex-
ercises and identify the sources of the changes in the distribution of duration
over the ten-year period (see Appendix A for further details).
Figure (4) presents such a decomposition in terms of changes in the haz-
ard function. The “contribution of the covariates” results from comparing the
hazard function that would have occurred in 1998 if all covariates had been
distributed as in 1988 with the marginal hazard function estimated for 1998.
The contribution of “coeﬃcients” results from comparing the marginal hazard
estimated with the 1988 data with the one that would have occurred in 1998 if
all covariates had been distributed as in 1988.
Several points are worth noting:
• Overall, there was a clear increase in the aggregate hazard rate for du-
ration spells The increase in the hazard rate is more pronounced for the
initial four weeks of unemployment. But this is simply an indication pro-
vided by the marginal hazard function, which, of course, combines into a
single function both the changes in the covariates and the changes in the
coeﬃcients.
• Underlying the marginal hazard function, there is evidence that the changes
in the covariates produced an increase in the hazard function lasting up
to half a year.
• The “structural features of the economy” (that is, the changes in the
coeﬃcients), however, are responsible for the rise of the hazard function for
short-term unemployed and a decline for longer-term unemployed. Indeed,
hazard rates declined for durations longer than 5 weeks.
• Thus, after discounting the changes in the regressors over the ten-year
16Figure 4: Decomposition of the hazard function changes Top panel:
estimated marginal for 1998 minus estimated marginal for 1988; Middle panel:
contribution of the changes in the conditional hazard function; Bottom panel:
contribution of the changes in the distribution of the covariates.
17Quantiles (weeks)
10 50 90
Marginal -0.77 -2.80 -7.72
Cont. Cov’s -0.36 -1.82 -11.17
Cont. Coef’s -0.41 −1.00  3.41 
Table 5: Contributions to changes in the quantiles of the unemploy-
ment distribution (weeks). Median of 500 realizations((·) ∼ the 97.5%-2.5%
quantile range includes 0).
interval, short became shorter and long became longer
Table (5), which shows the contributions of changes in covariates and changes
in the coeﬃcients at diﬀerent quantiles of the duration distribution, provides a
less impressionistic view. “Covariate changes” appear to be more inﬂuential
than “coeﬃcient changes” reshaping the unemployment duration distribution.
Whereas “covariate changes” led to shorter durations across the board, “coeﬃ-
cient changes” produced shorter durations at low quantiles and longer duration
at high quantiles. The median unemployment duration decreased due to favor-
able contributions of both covariates and coeﬃcients.
4.2 Composition Eﬀects
As we have seen , the jobless population and the economic context of displace-
ment change in the decade between surveys: becoming older and more educated;
there is a higher proportion of females; written pre-notiﬁcation of impending
lay-oﬀ became more common; and the macroeconomic conditions at the time of
displacement were more favorable. Overall, these changes decreased the jobless
duration more or less uniformly for all durations. A ﬁner analysis requires the
estimation of the impact of each of those changes on the conditional distribution
of durations.
Using the techniques described in Appendix A it is possible to isolate the
contribution of the changes in the distribution of each covariate to the changes
in the distribution of durations of joblessness spells. As it turns out, only three
18Quantiles (weeks)
10 50 90
Age -0.005 0.361 2.213
-0.165;0.177 -0.780;1.418 -2.313;7.296
Gender (male=1) -0.008 0.049 -0.007
-0.179;0.170 -0.998;1.130 -4.543;5.180
Unemp. Rate -0.159 -1.378 -8.682
-0.300;-0.019 -2.348;-0.512 -12.079;-4.911
Table 6: Contribution of selected covariates to the change in the
quantiles of the unemployment distribution. Median and 95% interval
estimates (in weeks) of the changes in the quantiles (1998“minus” 1988) of the marginal
and of the counterfactual distributions (based on 500 replications).
variables had a non-negligible composition eﬀect (weighted by the estimated
1988 conditional distribution): age, gender and unemployment rate. Table (4.2)
estimates the impact of these changes in three selected quantiles of the duration
distribution. The ﬁgures represent the median and 95% interval estimates of the
changes in the quantiles of the marginal and of the counterfactual distributions
over 500 resamples. For instance, we estimate that the median duration is 1.39
weeks longer in 1988 than it would have been if the unemployment rate had
been distributed as in 1998 (given the 1988 conditional distribution and keeping
all other covariates with their 1988 sample distributions).
The ageing of the population increased durations mainly for the long-term
unemployed (those in the right tail of the unemployment duration distribution).
The larger share of women had a rather limited eﬀect. The contribution of
these two variables is, however, numerically small and estimated without much
precision. Unemployment rate, on the other hand, caused a sizeable decrease of
durations over the entire distribution, and appears to be the major force behind
the composition eﬀects.
4.3 Changes in the conditional duration
As we have already seen, the major changes in the conditional distribution
were an increased sensitivity of duration to the unemployment rate and a steep
downturn in the intercept (see Tables (3) and (4)). That is, unemployment
19duration increased relative to the unemployment rate (ceteris paribus)a n dt h e
baseline subpopulation (of white married males, with average schooling and
tenure, displaced without notice and by reasons other than plant closing in a
state with average unemployment) experienced shorter unemployment spells.
The former eﬀect shifts the distribution of unemployment duration to the right
while the latter shifts it to the left. This is a critical structural result, one that
shapes the evolution of the unemployment duration distribution, even though
is partially counteracted by the change in the intercept.
Figure (5) representsthe ceteris paribus magnitude of those shifts in weeks.Per
se, the drop in the intercept is estimated to reduce the median duration by 2.30
weeks. On the other hand, the higher sensitivity to the unemployment rate in-
creases the median duration by 4.90 weeks. The joint eﬀect of the two coeﬃcient
shifts tuns out to be 0.83 weeks at the median. It should be noted, nevertheless,
that the change in the unemployment rate coeﬃcient is particularly strong at
the right tail of the unemployment duration distribution. Because of this, the
net eﬀect of the two coeﬃcient changes produces a sharp increase in unemploy-
ment duration at the upper quantiles of the distribution (see the third panel of
Figure (5)), making long durations longer.
4.4 Summary
We have identiﬁed three major forces reshaping the unemployment duration
distribution. One is the improved overall economic environment as measured
by the lower state unemployment rate at the time of displacement. Interest-
ingly, composition eﬀects related to age and gender appear to have played no
signiﬁcant role.
The other two forces, with conﬂicting impacts on the duration distribution,
relate to more fundamental economic mechanisms were: the sharp decline in the
intercept and the higher sensitivity of unemployment duration to unemployment
rates. In the next sections we will show how these changes are related to the
upward trend of job-to-job transitions in the U.S. labor market as indicated by
Farber (2003), and may be explained by improved job screening processes.
5 Job-to-job transitions
Job-to-job transitions increased sharply from the 1988 to the 1998 survey. In
fact, the proportion of direct transitions increased from 12 percent to 18.9 per-
20Figure 5: Impact on duration (in weeks) of changes in QR coeffi-
cients.
21Figure 6: Increased job-to-job transitions and centercept changes.
cent over this period. A hike in the share of job-to-job transitions is expected
because labor market conditions improved, as indicated by the decline of the un-
employment rate, but the increase in job-to-job transitions was over and above
what was to be expected from the lower unemployment rates.10 Furthermore, it
appears that the incidence of job-to-job transitions became more sensitive to the
UR. It is clear that job-to-job transitions played a pivotal role in the U.S. labor
market over this period. Job-to-job ﬂows are often neglected in the analysis of
labor market adjustments, but there is an increasingly widespread belief that
such ﬂows play a center-stage role (Fallick and Fleischman, 2004; Hall, 2005;
and Shimer 2005).11
The evidence on job-to-job transitions naturally leads to the following two
questions: Is the drop in the intercept accounted for by an increased share of
direct transitions? Is there a connection between the increased sensitivity to
the unemployment rate and the share of direct transitions? A straightforward
way to answer these questions is to exclude employment changes without an
intervening joblessness spell in the estimation procedure. It is clear that in
proceeding in this way one uses a more conventional deﬁnition of unemployment
duration, though at the cost of some (important) informational loss.
The quantile regression estimate for the intercept in a sample restricted
10A straightforward probit regression of the probability of direct transitions on the un-
employment rate and a dummy variable identifying the 1998 survey gives a positive and
statistically signiﬁcant regression coeﬃcient to the survey dummy.
11See Blanchard and Diamond (1990) for an early treatment of worker ﬂows in the U.S.
labor market.
22to durations greater or equal to one week is summarized in Figure (6). It is
transparent in the ﬁgure that the drop in the intercept at the left tail of the
distribution that is observed in the 1998 survey reﬂects in large part the increase
in the incidence of job-to-job transitions. This outcome very likely reﬂects the
increase in the probability mass at very low durations.12
6 A simple accounting framework
How to reconcile higher exit rates at low duration with higher average duration
or longer right tails of the duration distribution? Here, a tentative explanation
based on the notion of improved search technology will be oﬀered. Our reason-
ing is based on the evidence of the widespread reliance of ﬁrms on temporary
help agencies (Autor, 2001), on the increasing popularity of internet job search
and hiring (Kuhn and Skuterud, 2004), the introduction of proﬁling procedures
by the state unemployment insurance oﬃces (Katz and Krueger, 1999; Berger,
et al., 2001 ), and the extensive use of (low-cost) job screening tests and ﬂexible
staﬃng arrangements (Houseman, 2001 and Autor and Scarborough, 2004). In
essence, it will be argued that improved job screening mechanisms may indeed
lend support to the twofold outcome of longer average (measured) unemploy-
ment duration and higher job-to-job transition rates.
We subsequently, explore a very simple model of a binomial mixture of du-
ration distributions that is able to reproduce this outcome through the process
of sorting generated by a more eﬃcient screening technology. It is argued that
whereas more-able individuals will face higher probabilities of being hired (and,
also, of experiencing direct job-to-job transitions), less-able workers will be con-
fronted with lower arrival rates of job oﬀers, thus lengthening their joblessness
experience.
Suppose that job-oﬀers arise as a Poisson process with rate λ, and that there
are two types of workers, A and B,w i t h
λA >λ B
The proportion of types A (the more-able individuals) in the unemployment
stock at t is denoted by p(t) and it is assumed, without loss of generality, that
12When one focuses only on those that have experienced a joblessness spell, we also see that
duration has declined relative to unemployment rates in the left tail but increased in the right
tail, further amplifying our previous result that short durations became shorter and longer
durations became longer. It is not clear, however, whether this latter outcome can again be
interpreted as a genuine shift in the unemployment duration distribution or simply an illusion
produced by the (artiﬁcial) truncation of the distribution.
23p(0) = 1/2. If all job oﬀers are taken, the unemployment duration survivor
function at t is
S(t)=p(t)exp{−λAt} +( 1− p(t))exp{−λBt}
Better screening may be modelled by an increase in the exit rate from unem-
ployment for the more able workers, dλA > 0, and a decrease for the others,
dλB < 0. The impact of such a change is
dS(t)
S(t)











If the overall rate of job oﬀers stays constant, dλA +dλB = 0, it is therefore
clear that dS(t) > 0. That is, in this case one expects to observe the coexistence
of both higher hazards at low durations together with longer average duration.
Alternatively, suppose there is an expansion of the exit rate from unemploy-
ment, that is dλA + dλB > 0. Now, noticing that ω(0) = 1 and that ω(t) < 0,
since −dλB/dλA < 1 it is possible to ﬁnd a t (> 0) for which
dS(t) < 0f o rt<t
  and dS(t) > 0f o rt>t
 .
Consequently, better screening with expansion of job oﬀers reduces duration
on the left tail (makes short shorter) and increases durations in the right tail
(makes long longer).
7 Conclusions
The starting point of this paper was the evidence that measured unemployment
duration in the U.S. increased substantially relative to unemployment rates.
In part, this was an illusion generated by the fact that job-to-job transitions
are not included in the computation of average unemployment duration. But
other mechanisms were at work increasing the hazard function for short-term
unemployed and dampening the hazard function for long-term unemployed.
Here, the decomposition method proposed by Machado and Mata (2005)
was employed in order to disentangle the contribution of the changes generated
24by covariates’ distribution and the conditional distribution. The estimation
indicates that compositional changes in the labor force played a limited role.
Improved macroeconomic conditions visibly shifted the unemployment duration
distribution to the left. But, apart from this mechanical impact, important
structural changes, captured in the changes of the regression coeﬃcients, were
at play:
− Over the sampling period (1985-87 to 1995-97) there was a sharp increase
in the incidence of direct job-to-job transitions that was above and beyond
what would be expected from the decline in the unemployment rates.
− The conditional distribution of joblessness duration exhibited lower dura-
tions at low quantiles, implying that short durations became even shorter.
− On the right tail, however, the conditional distribution of joblessness du-
ration, showed longer spells. In other words, long durations became even
longer.
We rationalize our ﬁndings arguing that improved screening technology is
likely to be the relevant underlying mechanism at work. It is argued that
whereas more-able individuals will face higher probabilities of being hired (and
also of experiencing direct job-to-job transitions), their less-able counterparts
will confront a lower arrival rate of job oﬀers, thereby lengthening their jobless-
ness experience. A number of developments in the U.S. are likely to enhance
the process of job screening: job search through the Internet, the increasing
demand for placements through temporary help ﬁrms, and the use of proﬁling
by the state unemployment insurance oﬃces.
In a nutshell, if job screening is improved, thus enabling employers to bet-
ter sort their job applicants, longer (measured) average unemployment duration
may be an inevitable outcome of a more eﬃcient labor market. In addition, if
employers use the worker unemployment duration as a screening signal (Blan-
chard and Diamond, 1994), improved screening makes such a signal less blurred,
further deepening the distinction between short- and long-term unemployed.
Finally, a note of caution is in order. These results rely solely on the jobless-
ness experience of displaced workers and may not apply to other unemployment
experiences, for example, the unemployment experience of job market incom-
ers and re-entrants or job quitters. A longer time frame may also prove to be
necessary in order to circumvent outcomes that may be cycle idiosyncratic.
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28Appendix A: Econometric methodology
Censored quantile regressions
Let Ti represents the duration of the “most representative” unemployment spell
of individual i and xi (x1i ≡ 1) be the vector of covariates for the ith observation.
We consider statistical models specifying , the pth (p ∈ (0,1)) quantile of T as
Qy(T)(p|x)=x
β(p)( 1 )
where y(·) ≡ log and β(p) is a vector of QR parameters, varying from quantile
to quantile.
Our sample provides information on complete unemployment durations, but
there are some incomplete spells (right-censoring). Moreover, to avoid prob-
lems with taking logs of very short spells (0 or close to 0 weeks) we, arbi-
trarily, censored durations inferior to 0.25 at 0.25 weeks. The sample infor-
mation we consider may thus be represented by (y 
i ,x i),i=1 ,...,n where
y 
i = min[max(yi,l),u i], ui denotes the upper threshold for yi and l the left-
censoring point (l = log(0.25)). When observation i is not censored ui was
taken to be the potential censoring duration (for instance, for a spell of six
weeks starting in March 1997, ui was 44 weeks). The QR estimator minimizes








pz for z ≥ 0
(p − 1)z for z<0,
(Powell 1984, 1986). Estimation was performed iteratively using Buchinsky’s
(1994) ILPA procedure with the modiﬁcation suggested by Fitzenberger (1997).
The quantile estimation uses the Frisch-Newton algorithm (see Koenker and
Portnoy, 1997) implemented in the function rq in the quantreg package for R,
Koenker (1991). For the estimation of standard errors for the individual coeﬃ-
cients we resort to the bootstrap. Since the “errors” from the QR equation are
not necessarily homogeneously distributed, to achieve robustness we resample
(y,x,l,u) following the method of Billias et al. (2000).
Due to censoring, it may not be possible to identify the whole quantile
process. Let (pl,p u) represent the range of quantiles that can be consistently






I(l + ξ<x 
iβ(p) <u i − ξ)xix
i}
is uniformly positive deﬁnite in n for some ξ>0 (Fitzenberger (1997), Theorem
2.1).
Machado and Mata decomposition
The conditional quantile process – i.e., Qy(p | x) as a function of p ∈ (0,1) – pro-
vides a full characterization of the conditional unemployment duration in much
the same way as ordinary sample quantiles characterize a marginal distribution.
The resampling procedures proposed in Machado and Mata (2005) (henceforth,
M&M) provide an easy way of simulating a random sample, {T  
i ,i=1 ,...,m},
from a conditional distribution of duration times that is consistent with the
restrictions imposed on the conditional quantiles by the QR model. For com-
pleteness we outline here the procedure:
1. Generate m random draws from a Uniform distribution on (pl,p u), πi,i=
1,...,m;
2. For each πi estimate the QR model (1), thereby obtaining m vectors ˆ β(πi);
3. For a given value of the covariates, x0,
T
 
i ≡ ˆ QT(πi|x0)=g(x

0ˆ β(πi)) i =1 ,...,m,
is a random sample from the estimated conditional c.d.f. FT(t|X = x0)
censored at pl and pu.
The sample generated by the procedure above is drawn from the conditional
distribution. In many instances it is important to integrate out the conditioning
covariates. This integration or marginalization can be performed with respect
to diﬀerent joint distributions, g(x), of the covariates. The approach in M&M
may be described as follows:
1. As described before, generate πi,i=1 ,...,m and estimate the corre-
sponding ˆ β(πi);
2. Generate a random sample of size m from a given g(x); let it be denoted
by {x 
i}, i =1 ,...m.
303. Obtain
T  




which is a random sample from the marginal distributions of durations
times implied by the model postulated for the quantile process and by the
assumed joint distribution of the covariates.
When g(x) is an estimate of the actual distribution of the covariates in the
population, the resulting sample of durations is drawn from the actual marginal
distribution. In this case, {x 
i} may be obtained by drawing with replacement
from the rows of X, the regressors’ data matrix. But, in reality, g(x)m a yb ea n y
distribution of interest. If it is an estimate of the distribution of the covariates
in 1988 (g(x(1988))), the resulting durations will constitute a simulated sample
from the marginal distribution of durations that would have prevailed in 1998
if all covariates had been distributed as in 1988, (assuming, of course, that the
β vector was estimated with 1998 data).
Comparing this counterfactual sample with samples of durations from the
actual marginals for 1998 and 1988, it is possible to derive Oaxaca type decom-
positions for the entire distribution, rather than for just its mean. Speciﬁcally,
it is possible to decompose the observed changes in those due to changes in the
conditional distribution of durations (the β’s) and those stemming from changes
in the joint distribution of the covariates. Other decompositions of interest of-
ten involve isolating the contribution of a single covariate. For further details
on how to implement this decomposition, see M&M.)
In the implementation of the method in this paper we made pl =0 .10 and
pu =0 .95 and estimated the quantile regression coeﬃcients at equally spaced
intervals of length 0.005. We then draw 1000 (= m)o fs u c he s t i m a t e sw i t h
replacement. A code in R with the whole procedure is available on request.
Hazard functions estimation
Having obtained a simulated random sample, {T  
i ,i=1 ,...,m}, from the dis-
tribution of duration time of interest (conditional, marginal or counterfactual)
the usual methods of density estimation and hazard function estimation may
be applied. In situations where, due to censoring, the top quantiles cannot
be consistently estimated, the estimated function must be adequately rescaled.
Speciﬁcally, assuming that quantile process is only identiﬁed in (pl,p u), the
31results in Silverman (186, p.148) yield,
ˆ h(t|x)=
(pu − pl)f (t)
1 − pl − (pu − pl)F (t)
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